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1
INTRODUCTION
Nigeria’s oil and gas production primarily takes place in
the Niger Delta Region (NDR) but this region’s
communities hardly benefit from the huge oil income.1
However, these communities continue to bear the
persistent large-scale negative environmental and socio-
economic impacts of oil production2 while they are
also being deprived of their traditional means of
livelihood such as fishing and farming.3  These adverse
social, economic and environmental impacts and the
underdevelopment of the NDR have allegedly led to
the indigenes’ perennial protests over marginalisation.4
In addressing the alleged marginalisation and negative
impacts of oil operations on the NDR communities,
the Nigerian government established the Niger Delta
Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000 as a form
of  government compensation scheme. Yet, no
empirical studies have examined this institution as a
compensation scheme.
Thus, this paper seeks to problematise the NDDC as a
government compensation scheme (GCS)5 aimed at
mitigating the impacts of environmental degradation
on the NDR. More specifically, the paper will assess the
extent this GCS has performed its mandate and been
constrained. To address the research problem, this paper
adopts a mixed method (qualitative and quantitative)
approach.6 It draws on survey and interviews to
provide quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence
respectively to gain insight into the extent the functions
of the NDDC fits with the GCS.  Following the
empirical findings, the paper concludes that the GCS
methodology focusing on environmental remediation
potentially offers a better succour to the Niger Delta
people than human capital and infrastructural
development focuses would offer.
The reminder of this paper is organised as follows.
Section 2 conceptualises GCS as a tool for
environmental management, while section 3 discusses
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1 Lawrence A Atsegbua, Vincent Akpotaire and Folarin
Dimowo, Environmental Law in Nigeria, Theory and
Practice (2nd edn, Ambik Press 2010) 94-95.
2 Yinka Omorogbe, ‘Regulation of Oil Industry Pollution
in Nigeria’ in Epiphany Azinge (ed), New Frontiers in
Law (Oliz Publishers 1993) 148; Osamuyimen Enabulele,
Mahdi Zahra and Franklin N Ngwu, ‘Addressing Climate
Change Due to Emission of Greenhouse Gases
Associated with the Oil and Gas Industry: Market-Based
Regulation to the Rescue’ in Maria A Gonzalez-Perez
and Liam Leonard (eds), Climate Change and the 2030
Corporate Agenda for Sustainable Development
(Emerald Group Publishing Limited 2016) 56.
3 Legborsi S Pyagbara, ‘The Adverse Impacts of Oil Pollution
on the Environment and Wellbeing of  a Local
Indigenous Community: The Experience of the Ogoni
People of Nigeria’ (International Expert Group Meeting
on Indigenous People and Protection of Environment,
Khabarovsk, Russian, August 2007) 9; Ikenna V Ejiba,
Simeon C Onya and Oluwadamilola K Adams, ‘Impact
of Oil Pollution on Livelihood: Evidence from the
Niger Delta Region of Nigeria’ (2016) 12(5) Journal of
Scientific Research & Reports 1, 4; and  Z A Elum, K
Mopipi and A Henri-Ukoha, ‘Oil Exploitation and its
Socioeconomic Effects on the Niger Delta Region of
Nigeria’ (2016) 23(13) Environmental Science and
Pollution Research 12889.
4 Nelson E Ojukwu-Ogba, ‘Legal and Regulatory
Instruments on Environmental Pollution in Nigeria:
Much Talk, Less Teeth’ (2006) 8 International Energy
Law and Taxation Review 201.
5 Government compensation scheme have been known
as various names such as administrative compensation
scheme, state compensation scheme or state
compensation programme.
6 The fieldwork was mainly conducted in five States in the
NDR (Akwa – Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, Edo and Rivers) and
others conducted in Lagos State where the headquarters
of most oil companies and regulatory bodies are located.
Survey and interview participants were drawn from
different stakeholder groups such as members of oil-
producing communities, oil companies, regulatory
bodies, legal practitioners, accounting professionals and
interventionist agency. While 350 questionnaires were
administered and 281 were both returned and usable
for analysis, 25 semi-structured interviews were also
conducted.
the relevant provisions of NDDC Act7 in relations to
the GCS. Next, section 4 presents the empirical findings
followed by the discussion of empirical findings in
section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper and
offers some recommendations.
2
CONCEPTUALISING  GOVERN-
MENT COMPENSATION SCHEME
The foundation of government compensation scheme
(GCS) lies on the inadequacies in effectively
compensating victims of crimes.8 It is on this logical
premise that the offender’s interest should not be placed
before the victim’s interest.9 In resonance, Floyd argued
that:
We are dedicated to insuring that due
process is accorded to all persons accused
of crime; and we are also concerned with
rehabilitating the criminal - and justly
so! But we need also to concern
ourselves as energetically with the plight
of the victim and his rehabilitation.10
The above resonates with a situation where plenty
resources are channelled towards the rehabilitation of
convicts and less attention accorded the welfare of the
victims. Given the illogicality of such stance by public
scrutiny, the State is motivated to intervene through
establishing compensatory schemes.11 Government’s
adoption of compensation schemes is driven by
restitution, due duty of care owed to its citizens and
social welfare.12  Thus, GCSs are part of  a government’s
interventionist action plans to offer mutual protection
and security on the basis of social welfare.13  In principle
therefore, it can be argued that the GCS is usually
anchored on the general principle of risk distribution
with a fault or non-fault system as its base.14
However, the GCS should be clearly distinguished from
compensatory damages, which are money awarded to a
plaintiff to compensate for damages, injury or another
incurred loss. Compensatory damages are awarded in
civil cases where loss has occurred because of negligence
or unlawful conduct of another party through the torts
system.15 In contrast, the GCS serves as a substitute
and/or complements to the tort system.16
Notwithstanding that the GCS was ideologically framed
to provide respite to crime victims, its adoption has
been extended to other deprived and victimised people
across different facets of  the society. For instance, the
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7 The Niger Delta Development Commission
(Establishment etc) Act. No. 6 LFN 2000 [hereafter NDDC
Act].
8  Olanrewaju Fagbohun, The Law of Oil Pollution and
Environmental Restoration: A Comparative Review
(Odade Publishers, 2010) 204; and Peter Cane, Atiyah’s
Accidents, Compensation and the Law (7th edn,
Cambridge University Press 2006) 304.
9  Her Majesty Stationary Office, Penal Practice in a
Changing Society: Aspects of Future Development
Aspects of  Future Development (England and Wales)
(CMND 645, Her Majesty Stationary Office 1959) 7.
10 Glenn Floyd, ‘Compensation to Victims of Violent
crime’ (1970) 6(2) Tulsa Law Review 100.
11 Fagbohun (n 8) 204.
12 Floyd (n 10) 110-115; and Andrew Ashworth,
‘Punishment and Compensation: Victims, Offenders and
the State’ (1986) 6 Oxford Journal Legal Studies 86.
13 Fagbohun (n 8) 204.
14 ibid.
15 Donald Harris, David Campbell and Roger Halson,
Remedies in Contract and Tort (2nd edn, Cambridge
University Press 2002) 21; Mark Lunney, and Ken
Oliphant, Tort Law: Text and Materials (5th edn, Oxford
University Press 2008) 847; Ekhator noted that in Nigeria
there is heavy reliance on the principles of tort in
getting compensation. See, Eghosa O Ekhator ‘Public
Regulation of the Oil and Gas Industry in Nigeria: An
Evaluation’ (2016) 21 Annual Survey of International &
Comparative Law 43, 77.
16 Albert C Lin, ‘Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of
Environmental Toxic Injury’ [2015] Southern California
Law Review 1439, 1443; Clifford Fisher, ‘The Role of
Causation in Science as Law and Proposed Changes in
the Current Common Law Toxic Tort System’ (2001) 9
Buffalo Environmental Law Journal 35.
GCS has been extended to healthcare,17 agriculture,18
and indeed as a response to environmental pollution.19
Moreover, over the years, GCSs have been established
in different jurisdiction to recompense environmentally
victimised people as an alternative means of
recompensing those people.20 According to Lin, GCSs
are advantageous in bringing respite to environmentally
victimised people in the sense that: (i) they typically
employ specialised or expert decision makers, who can
conduct their own studies and consider a broad range
of information; (ii) provide more continuous oversight
and distribute compensation more fairly among a class
of  victims; and (iii) administrative systems are in theory,
more politically accountable than other means of
recompensing victims such as litigation.21 It is thus
deducible that the GCS is a choice option in
recompensing environmentally victimised people due
to its organised structure.
An application of GCS in the NDR is of paramount
importance given the pervasive environmental
degradation caused by oil operations and the attendant
social, economic and developmental dislocations it
creates for the Niger Delta people. Environmental
degradation impacts on ecosystems and social
systems.22 It subsequently harms the ‘characteristic
aspects of the landscape’ and impairs the ‘lifestyle of
indigenous communities’.23 As such, the victims of
oil pollution may be humans, the environment
(including fauna and flora) or both.24  This dual impact
makes the GCS suitable for recompensing the affected.
It is therefore necessary for the design of compensatory
schemes to encompass solutions addressing these two
components. However, Bowman argues that
compensation schemes established in most
jurisdictions as responses to environmental pollution
fail to recognise harm to the environment.25 Instead,
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17 Marie Bismark and others, ‘Accountability Sought by
Patients Following Adverse Events from Medical Care:
The New Zealand experience’ (2006) 17 Canadian
Medical Association Journal 889.
18 Patience Elabor-Idemudia, ‘Nigeria: Agricultural Exports
and Compensatory Schemes-rural Women’s Production
Resources and Quality of Life’ in Pamela Sparr (ed),
Mortgaging Women’s Lives: Feminist Critiques of
Structural Adjustment (Zed Press 1994) 134-154.
19 See, Japan’s administrative compensation program which
was established by virtue of the Kôgai Kenkô Higai
Hoshô Hô [Pollution-Related Health Damage
Compensation Law], Law No. 111 of  1973; Alice Stewart,
‘Japan’s 1987 Amendment to the 1973 Pollution-Related
Health Damage Compensation Law: Tort Reform and
Administrative Compensation in Comparative
Perspective’ (1988) 29 Harvard International Law Journal
475; Rabin L Robert, ‘Some Thoughts on the Efficacy
of  a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme’
(1993) 52 Maryland Law Review 951; and Lin (n 16) 1494-
1500.
20 In Canada compensation schemes are structured to
recompense aboriginal communities. See, Robert
Mainville, An Overview of  Aboriginal and Treaty Rights
and Compensation for their Breach (Purich 2001) 128.
21 Lin (n 16) 1464-1470.
22 Paul Wapner, ‘Environmental Ethics and Global
Governance: Engaging the International Liberal
Tradition’ (1997) 3(2) Global Governance 213. Lee
underscored that ‘social welfare needs of residents in
environmentally polluted communities are a multi-
dimensional, long-term issue. [Tackling it holistically
will do a lot] …to bring about sustainable development’.
Tsuey-Ping Lee, ‘A Welfare Approach to Mitigating
Environmental Injustice: Exploring Needs of Pollution
Victims’ (2009) 29 <http://www.umdcipe.org/
conferenc es/epckdi/2.pdf>.
23 Michael M O’Hear, ‘Sentencing the Green-Collar
Offender: Punishment, Culpability and Environmental
Crime’ (2004) 95(1) The Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology 133, 163.
24 Ambrose OO Ekpu, ‘Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage: The Need for Equity’ (20th International
Conference of the Society of Petroleum Engineers
1996) 242, 255; and Osamuyimen Enabulele, ‘Oil
Pollution and the Polluter Pays Principle: The Nigerian
Experience’ (PhD thesis, Glasgow Caledonian
University 2018) 41.
25 Michael Bowman, ‘The Definition and Valuation of
Environmental Harm: An Overview’ in Michael
Bowman and Alan Boyle (eds), Environmental Damage
in International and Comparative Law: Problems of
Definition and Valuation (Oxford University Press 2002)
12-13; and O’Hear (n 23) 163.
those schemes have been ‘concerned with the
infringement of established human interests relating
to the person or property caused through the medium
of the environment’.26 By implication, most
jurisdictions’ GCSs established as responses to
environmental degradation pay little or no attention to
environmental remediation, but focus on resolving
human claims. This attitude towards the environment
apparently resonates with the traditional perception that
the environment is a free resource ripe for plunder,27
which negates concern for future generations.
GCS can be designed to provide ex ante and ex post
compensation.28 This implies that it can be designed
to address the needs of current and future victims of
environmental degradation. It has been argued that to
aid a large group of people to recover from severe
environmental degradation, it is crucial to map out a
long-term package to cater for their multiple needs,
taking into consideration their peculiar characteristics.29
GCSs are essential in this context as they are usually
designed to bring succour to a large populace, which
make them efficient schemes for addressing such
environmental challenges.30 However, the GCS has
been criticised for its high administration costs when
compensable harms are broad.31 Its administration
varies across jurisdictions.
By nature, GCSs are administrative and funded by the
government on a welfare basis,32 but in some
jurisdictions they are designed to levy polluting
companies for funding.33 Such funding arrangement
echoes the polluter pays principle (PPP) where the
polluter is responsible for the prevention and
compensation of victims.34 It also has the potential to
serve as a deterrent to other operators in the same line
of business in that operators fund the compensation
scheme. However, the operators may ultimately transfer
the costs of such levies to the consumers,35 thereby
distorting the deterrent effect of the GCS.36 Another
downside is that the operators may perceive their
contribution to the compensation funds as a leeway to
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26 Bowman ibid and O’Hear ibid.
27 Bowman ibid 13.
28 Lin (n 16) 1486; and Daniel A Farber, ‘Basic
Compensation for Victims of Climate change’ (2007)
155(6) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1605,
1635-1639.
29 Lee (n 22) 29.
30 Matthew Hall, ‘Criminal Redress in Cases of
Environmental Victimisation: A Defence (2016) 49 (2)
Revue Criminologie 141.
31 Farber (n 28) 1646.
32 Matthew Hall, Victims of Environmental Harm: Rights,
Recognition and Redress under National and
International Law (Routledge 2013) 114.
33 ibid; and Farber (n 28) 1607.
34 The PPP essentially creates a strict regime of standard
setting for pollution prevention, an obligation for
polluters to clean-up and remediate the environment
as well as compensate victims of environmental
pollution. The main goals of the principle are cost
allocation and internalisation while its functions are
economic integration, redistribution, preventive as well
as curative functions. The principle has been
interpreted among others to be a principle of  efficiency,
equity or fairness, potentially produces pedagogical
and deterrent effects as well as promotes international
harmonization of national environmental policies. See
Hakeem Ijaiya, ‘The Principle of Sustainable
Development: An Appraisal of the Polluter Pays
Principle in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry (2013) 4
(1) Malaysia Lega Network Series 1, 12-13; Margaret R
Grossman, ‘Agriculture and the Polluter Pays Principle:
An Introduction’ (2006) 59 (1) Oklahoma Law Review
1; Nicolas de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles, from
Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford University
Press 2002) 21-60; Mizan R Khan, ‘Polluter-Pays-
Principle: The Cardinal Instrument for Addressing
Climate Change’ (2015) 4(3) Laws 638; Edwin
Woerdman, Alessandra Arcuri and Stefano Clo,
‘Emissions Trading and the Polluter-Pays Principle:
Do Polluters Pay Under Grandfathering?’ (2008) 4(2)
Review of Law & Economics 565; Hans C Bugge, ‘The
Principles of Polluter Pays in Economics and Law’ in
Erling Eide and Roger Van Der Bergh (eds), Law and
Economics of the Environment (Juridisk Forlag 1996)
53–90; Sanford E Gaines, ‘Polluter-pays Principle: From
Economic Equity to Environmental Ethos (1991) 26
Texas International Law Journal 463; and Enabulele (n
24) 63-77.
35 Hall (n 30) 114; and Farber (n 28) 1607.
36 Hall (n 30) 141; and Farber (n 28) 1635-1639.
polluter. It has been argued that the government could
be considered a polluter where ‘…regulatory authority
performs the dual functions of an operational and a
regulatory authority [and/ or ] …when the government
enters a joint venture agreement with the operator and
subsequently pollution arises from the joint venture
operations’.41 Hence, the government becomes partly
liable for pollution caused by the activity of the joint
ventures. Currently the principal compensation scheme
operational in the NDR is through the Niger Delta
Development Commission (NDDC).
NDDC was established through an act of Parliament42
in response to longstanding demands by the NDR
States for a more equitable distribution of wealth
generated from their region and to address both
environmental and other social-economic problems in
the NDR.43 Prior to the NDDC, interventionist
mandates were delivered, albeit unsuccessfully, by
various statutory bodies or interventionist agencies such
as the Niger Delta Development Board, Niger Delta
Basin Development Authority, and Oil Mineral
Producing Area Development Commission
(OMPADEC). An NDDC Act repealed the
OMPADEC Decree 1998 as the agency created by the
latter failed in tackling the oil-driven environmental
crises in the NDR.44
The function of the NDDC includes inter alia:
formulation of  policies and guidelines for the
development of the NDR;45 to conceive, plan and
implement, in accordance with set rules and regulations,
projects and programmes for the sustainable
development of the NDR in the field of transportation
including roads, jetties and waterways, health,
education, employment, industrialization, agriculture
and fisheries, housing and urban development, water
supply, electricity and telecommunications;46 and
tackling ecological and environmental problems that
pollute, hence validating the ideology that pollution
can continue as long as compensation is paid. Also,
how the compensation funds are utilised is as important
as the creation of  the funds. It has been suggested that
the compensation funds are best utilised by tying them
to adaptation projects to prevent diverting them
towards paying financial compensation to victims.37
This suggests that victims must have other means of
seeking redress involving financial compensation.
Polluters must not commit to indiscriminate pollution
because of contribution to the funding scheme. Farber
has argued that the existence of GCS should not
preclude the utilisation of measures to prevent
environmental pollution.38 This suggests that
irrespective of the existence of compensation schemes,
pollution prevention should be the watchword.
Operators should adhere to regulatory requirements
while regulatory bodies are to continue to monitor
operators to ensure that preventive measures are met.
3
NIGER DELTA DEVELOPMENT
COMMISSION
Both the Nigerian governments and other stakeholders
recognise how oil operations have significantly affected
the environment and means of livelihood in the
NDR.39 Hence, the government’s initiation of
compensation schemes from time to time to ameliorate
the people’s plight. In most instances, compensation
schemes constitute an integral part of  government’s
action programme for the overall purpose of social
welfare or redistribution schemes.40 In principle, it is
apparent that GCS in relation to the NDR is
implemented on the premise that the government is a
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37 Farber (n 28) 1646.
38 ibid.
39 Pyagbara (n 3) 9; Ejiba and others (n 3) 4 and Elum and
others (n 3) 12889.
40 Fagbohun (n 8) 218.
41 See, Enabulele (n 24) 42.
42 NDDC Act, section 1 (1).
43 Amnesty International, Nigeria: Are Human Rights in
the Pipelines? (Amnesty International 9 November 2004)
11 < https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/
88000/afr440202004en.pdf>.
44 See, the preamble to the NDDC Act.
45 NDDC Act, section 7(1)(a).
46 NDDC Act, Sec 7(1)(b).
arise from oil exploration in the NDR.47 These
functions can be loosely classified into three categories
of: infrastructural development, human capital
development and environmental protection.
However, the above formulation is not set in stone – it
is fluid. For instance, provision of roads is basically
infrastructural development, but human capital
development can also be achieved through the process.
This is because road infrastructure facilitates accessibility
of the communities and job creation. Other
government ministries, departments and agencies in
Nigeria undertake functions like the NDDC’s. For
instance, the Federal Ministries of  Works and Health
deliver infrastructural development and health service
across Nigeria (including the NDR). Irrespective of the
mandates of those ministries or department to deliver
those social and developmental services, the NDDC
undertakes similar functions.48  In that regard, the
NDDC functions as a vehicle for government
compensation.  But the NDDC must be harnessed as
an integrated approach to bring respite to the NDR
people negatively impacted by oil operations by
touching every facet of  their wellbeing. This resonates
with the underpinnings of GCSs as instruments or
action plans aimed at succouring a large group of people
and helping them to recover from severe environmental
degradation by implementing a systematically structured
long-term package to meet their multiple needs with
peculiar characteristics.49 As earlier mentioned, the
NDDC’s functions loosely classified into infrastructural
development, human capital development and
environmental protection appear to represent a
systematically structured package to address diverse
needs in the NDR. Whether NDDC judiciously
discharges these responsibilities to the NDR people is
a different issue altogether. As such, this paper
problematises the NDDC as a government
compensation scheme (GCS) to gain insight into the
extent it has mitigated the impacts of environmental
degradation on the NDR. A systematic analysis of the
empirics is done in connection with the broad functions
of infrastructural development, human capital
development, and environmental protection.
4
ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
This section analyses the field-based empirical data from
survey and interviews of  various stakeholders to
provide insight into the extent the NDDC discharges
its GCS remits and its performance limiting factors.
These findings are thematically organised according to
the three broad functions of NDDC (infrastructural
development, human capital development, and
environmental protection) discussed earlier and the
performance limiting factors that systematically emerged
from the in-depth scrutiny of the qualitative empirical
data.
4.1 Broad Functions of the
NDDC
4.1.1 Infrastructural Development
NDDC was designed to provide infrastructural projects
for the NDR to bridge the region’s infrastructural deficits
compared to other parts of Nigeria and to give the
region access to modern facilities as dividends of
hosting oil operations. Our empirical survey evidence
shows that members of the oil-producing communities
are largely positive on NDDC’s effort at addressing
infrastructural deficiencies in the region (see figure 1).
As shown in figure 1, 63 per cent, 10 per cent and 27 per
cent respondents respectively are in agreement,
undecided, and in disagreement over NDDC’s success
at achieving infrastructural development in the Niger
Delta.
Similarly, the interviewees were positive about NDDC’s
performance in the area of infrastructural
development. For instance, Community stakeholder
1 said: ‘I think the NDDC is visible in my community.
The primary school that we have in the community is
being built by the NDDC. There is a one-kilometre
83
47 NDDC Act, Sec 7(1)(h).
48 See, Sec 7 of the NDDC Act.
49 Lee (n 22) 29.
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50 Interview with Community stakeholder 1, Community
Public Relations Officer, Edo State (Edo State, 02
February 2015).
51 Nelson E Ojukwu-Ogba, ‘Legislating Development in
Nigeria’s Oil Producing Region: The NDDC Act Seven
Years On’ (2009) African Journal of  International and
Comparative Law 136, 144.
Figure 1: To what extent would you agree that the NDDC has 
addressed infrastructural deficiencies? 
 Frequency Percent 
 Strongly agree 114 40.6 
Agree 62 22.1 
Undecided 28 10.0 
Strongly 24 8.5 
Strongly disagree 53 18.9 
Total 281 100.0 
 
road that was also done by the NDDC in the
community and probably a water scheme’.50  Both the
survey and interview results suggest that NDDC’s
infrastructural development interventionist actions
have been successful in bridging the infrastructural gap
in the NDR. This result corroborates Ojukwu-Ogba
who found that the NDDC has performed relatively
well in its equitable distribution of meaningful projects
across the oil-producing communities of the NDR,
gauged by the delivery of its objectives in concrete
terms.51
4.1.2 Human Capital Development
NDDC was also designed to fast-track human capital
development in the NDR in a bid to curb
unemployment. Elicited responses demonstrate that
majority of members of oil-producing communities
are of the opinion that the NDDC has improved
human capital development in their communities (see
figure 2). Their responses show that 74 per cent agreed,
8 per cent were undecided, while 17 per cent disagreed
over improved human capital development in their
communities.
The above position was supported by Community
stakeholder 5 who stated that:
The NDDC is trying, I must be sincere, [the]
government established NDDC to look into the
plight of Niger Delta Region and as a result they
have empowered our youths. They have provided
scholarships to many students and have aided
youths in skill acquisition. For instance, some
women were trained in hairdressing…52
The above narrative suggests that the NDDC to a large
extent has been able to enhance the capacity of the
people of  the NDR to earn a living. Hence, human
capital development as supported by the NDDC aims
to boost the living standards of the people. This
finding seems to contradict some previous studies that
argue that the NDDC has not made any significant
progress in improving the living conditions of the
Niger Delta people.53 There have been instances where
communities applauded the provision of skill
acquisition equipment, supply of books and science
equipment which, according to Imobighe, are mostly
provided with little or no consideration for their end
use or sustenance.54 From observation, standards of
living in most of the communities in the NDR are still
very low despite claims by the NDDC that things are
improving, and available statistics attest to this. For
instance, data provided by Amnesty International
indicates that the Niger Delta people are among the
most deprived oil-producing communities in the world
and about 70 per cent of the populace live on less than
US$1 a day – the standard economic measure of
absolute poverty.55
4.1.3 Environmental Protection
The NDDC Act specifically provides that the NDDC
should ‘tackle ecological and environmental problems
that arise from the exploration of oil mineral in the
Niger-Delta area…’ 56 One of the major visible
environmental problems arising from oil operations
in the NDR is oil spill, which requires clean-up and
remediation. While stakeholders consider the two prior
themes as areas the NDDC has positively performed
and delivered benefits to the Niger Delta people, the
NDDC has achieved underwhelming performance in
environmental protection.  The results in figure 3 shows
that 83 per cent respondents consider the NDDC as
performing poorly in addressing environmental
degradation problems, while 16 per cent and 1 per cent
respondents are positive and neutral respectively.
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52 Interview with Community stakeholder 5, Community
Member, Rivers State (Rivers State, 10 February 2015).
53 Thomas A Imobighe, ‘Conflict in the Niger Delta: A
Unique Case or a Model for Future Conflicts in other
Oil-Producing Countries?’ in Rudolf  Traub-Merz and
Douglas Yakes (eds), Oil policy in the Gulf  of  Guinea,
Security and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social
Development (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2004) 108 and
Akinwale A Ayofe and Evans Osabuohien, ‘Re-
Engineering the NDDC’s Master Plan: An Analytical
Approach’ (2009) 11(2) Journal of Sustainable
Development in Africa 142, 155.
54 Imobighe ibid 108.
55 Amnesty International, ‘Nigeria Ten Years On: Injustice
and Violence Haunt the Oil Delta’ (3 November 2005)
para.  1.1 <https://www.amnesty.org/download/
Documents/80000/afr440222005en.pdf>.
56 Sec 7(1)(h) of NDDC Act.
Interviewees were equally dissatisfied with NDDC’s
actions in discharging its environmental protection
function. Even an interviewed NDDC personnel 1 had
concerns with the NDDC’s disposition to
environmental protection stating that: ‘I will say from
my own perspective that we have not met the full
objective of environmental protection’.57 The above
account appears to demonstrate that environmental
protection has not received the deserved attention from
NDDC. Given that environmental degradation
underlies most of the problems in the NDR, one would
expect the NDDC to channel more resources towards
environmental remediation and restoration. Yet this is
not the case as confirmed by its insider member,
suggesting that the compensation scheme undermines
environmental concerns which primarily drive the
perennial agitations and socio-economic dislocations
in the Niger Delta.  Whilst there are constraints on the
agency’s performance, our findings agree with previous
studies that the NDDC has not made meaningful
progress in improving the environmental conditions
of the NDR since its establishment.58
4.2  Performance Limiting
Factors
An establishment of GCS is driven by the need to
address issues of restitution, duty of care and social
welfare.59 The NDDC’s activities align the NDDC with
the GCS ideals being a government’s structured action
plan to develop the Niger Delta. However, several
constraints have been identified as limiting the desired
performance of  this interventionist instrument. This
section presents empirical evidence of factors
constraining NDDC’s performance as a GCS.
4.2.1 Poor Funding
No compensation scheme can be successfully
implemented without adequate funding. Theoretically,
the NDDC is adequately funded.60 Its funds are
contributed as follows: (a) the federal government,
whose quota is the equivalent of fifteen per cent of the
total monthly statutory allocations due to member
States within the NDR;61 (b) fifty per cent of monies
due to states within the NDR from the ecological
fund;62 (c) three per cent of the total annual budget of
oil-producing companies operating within the NDR.63
Other sources of funding are grants, loans, gifts
deposited with the NDDC by any institution be they
local, international or raised by the NDDC themselves,
and proceeds from all other assets that may, from time
to time, accrue to the NDDC.64
Whilst the above suggests that NDDC is well funded
to have enough resources for its adaption projects in
the Niger Delta, our empirical evidence suggests
otherwise as the discrepancy relates to the actual
remittances the monies due the agency. For example,
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57 Interview with NDDC personnel 1, Senor Staff, Niger
Delta Development Commission (Port Harcourt, 18
February 2015).
58 Sylvester O Nliam, ‘Is the Precautionary Principle
Brought Home in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry?
Comparative Perspectives between Nigeria and the UK’
(PhD thesis, University of Aberdeen 2011) 250.
59 Floyd (n 10) 110-115.
60 Ojukwu-Ogba (n 51) 142; and Ayofe and Osabuohien
(n 53) 148-149.
61 NDDC Act, Sec 14 (2) (a).
62 NDDC Act, Sec 14 (2) (c).
63 NDDC Act, Sec 14 (2) (b). Oil companies claimed that
they have made huge financial contributions to the
NDDC. For instance, Shell its 2016 Sustainability Report
claimed that ‘[i]n 2016, the SPDC JV and SNEPCO
contributed $106.8 million (Shell share $48.5 million)
to the NDDC. Over the last five years Shell Companies
in Nigeria’s contribution to the NDDC totalled more
than $800 million (Shell share around $340 million)’.
See, Shell, Sustainability Report 2016, Our Activities in
Nigeria, <http://reports.shell.com/sustainability-
report/2016/managing-operations/our-activities-in-
nigeria.html>. Also, ExxonMobil claims that since the
inception of the NDDC it has contributed a total of
N160 billion. See, ExxonMobil, ‘Mobil Pays N160 billion
to NDDC in 14 Years’ (30 August 2015) <http://
motoringworldng.com/mobil-pays-n160-billion-to-
nddc-in-14-years/>.
64 See, NDDC Act, Sec 14 (2) (d) and (e).
The implication of the above narratives is that the
NDDC has become a medium for some individuals to
siphon money, as contracts are awarded to them and
payment made but projects are not executed. In
circumstances where they are executed, they are
substandard. Mboho and Inyang have argued that all
efforts by the government through statutory bodies
have been abject failures due to corruption,
maladministration and insincerity on the part of the
Federal Government.69
NDDC’s autonomy is lacking, like in other parts of  the
Nigerian oil industry, due to political interferences by
the government because of state corruption.70 The
issue of lack of autonomy has contributed to the
ineffective administration of the NDDC as a vehicle
for the actualisation of GCS in the NDR. According to
NDDC personnel 1, ‘…interference from the political
class equally hampers the deliverables of our activities’.71
The above suggests that without independence in
decision-making and project initiations, the NDDC
cannot fast-track the overall development process in
the NDR, which is consistent with Nliam’s argument
that the autonomy of the NDDC is threatened by
external influences.72
4.2.3   Inconsistent Coordination in Project  Impleme-
ntation
Furthermore, concerns were raised that there were
inconsistencies in the implementation of projects by
NDDC personnel 1 said that ‘[o]ne thing is what the
law says, another is the implementation. …but the
simple logic there is that the money required to
implement is not forthcoming. If  that money is not in
place, it will be more theoretical than being practical’.65
NDDC personnel 2 corroborated the above claims by
stating that ‘…there are a lot of projects that the
commission needs to embark upon, but funds are
simply not there... We have so many contactors who
are still being owed, not because the commission does
not consider it necessary to pay them but funds’.66
With this evidence, it is obvious the NDDC cannot
effectively discharge its functions.
4.2.2  Corruption and Lack of Autonomy
Corruption is endemic across all sectors in Nigeria.
Interviewees link the poor performance of  NDDC to
corruption.  For instance, Community stakeholder 2
said that:
NDDC is a conduit pipe. It is a very corrupt agency.
The government just set it up to enrich their cronies.
NDDC has not lived up to its billing because the
volume of jobs [the] NDDC has done is not
commensurate in any way with the money they have
gotten. Few projects executed lack quality because
they are not awarded to professionals.67
This view was echoed by Community stakeholder 3
who stated that the ‘[creation of the] NDDC was only
a conduit which top officials use in embezzling money
in the name of developing host communities. Roads
constructed by NDDC are even worse than access roads
in the community constructed by the oil companies’.68
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65 Personal Interview (n 57).
66 Interview with NDDC personnel 2, Senior Staff, Niger
Delta Development Commission, (Port Harcourt, 12
February 2015).
67 Interview with Community stakeholder 2, Community
Leader, Rivers State (Rivers State, 10 February 2015).
68 Interview with Community stakeholder 3, Community
Leader, Rivers State (Rivers State, 26 February 2015).
69 Kingdom S Mboho and A I Inyang ‘Institutional Failures
and Poverty in the Niger Delta Region: A Critical
Appraisal of NDDC Projects in Ikot Abasi, Akwa Ibom
State, Nigeria’ (2001) 2 (1) International Journal of
Economic Development Research and Investment 26,
27; and Kaniye SA Ebeku, ‘Niger Delta Oil, Development
of the Niger Delta and the New Development Initiative:
Some Reflections from a Socio-Legal Perspective’ (2008)
43(4) Journal of Asian and African Studies 399, 421. It
has been alleged that NDDC’s lack of  transparency is
responsible for the reluctance of oil companies to pay
their yearly counterpart funding. See, Amnesty
International (n 43) 7.
70 See, George S Akpan, ‘The Failure of Environmental
Governance and Implications for Foreign Investors and
Host States - A Study of the Niger Delta Region of
Nigeria’ [2006] International Energy Law & Taxation
Review 1, 7.
71 Personal Interview (n 57).
72 Nliam (n 58) 251.
NDDC staff. For example, NDDC personnel 1 said
that:
[It is] …because of the way the
commission is being run, maybe because
of the issue of continuity in
government. …the way it is structured
which is evident when a new regime
comes on board. Sometimes they seem
to deviate from the existing
programmes, so we are not
synchronising our activities together.
New board comes, new projects [are
initiated]. It leads to abandonment of
existing projects and programmes. So,
this actually hampers our total
objectives.73
The implication is that when there is a change in the
management of the NDDC, there is the tendency for
projects initiated by the previous administration to be
terminated. This is because the new administration
initiates new projects. This results in situations where
there are abandoned and uncompleted NDDC projects
dotted around States within the NDR. The NDDC
only identified the alienation with other development
stakeholders in the NDR in its report.74 However,
interview narratives suggested that the problem of
effective coordination also occurs within the governing
board of the NDDC. This clearly impedes the effective
establishment of GCS for recompensing victims of
environmental degradation, due to its organised
structure.75 It shows that in practice the NDDC has
experienced challenges as regards to its organisational
structure to ensure the efficient implementation of its
mandate.
4.2.4  Community Involvement/ Local Participation
The Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan
(NDRDMP)76 identifies public participation as an
avenue for effectively protecting the natural
environment.77 Concerns were raised that members
of oil-producing communities do not play a primary
role from conception to actualisation of projects
executed in their community by the NDDC.
Commenting on this issue, Community stakeholder 4
said ‘they (NDDC) do not consult us when they want
to execute most projects. At most what they do is to
acquire land from us then they build whatever in their
view suits us’.78  The implication is that initiatives for
the development of the community are devoid of
informal institutions innate in the community.79 This
situation reduces the robustness of the design and
implementation of development initiatives. A feature
which is lacking, as members of oil-producing
communities are not integrated in the process; and hence
the absence in consulting and integrating their wealth
of indigenous knowledge which is of incalculable
73 Personal Interview (n 57).
74 NDDC, ‘3rd Quarter Activities of the Commission for
the Period July-September 2016’ 16  <https://
pdfslide.net/ documents/this-report-covers-the-nddc-
niger-delta-development-nddcgovng1pdfdelta.html>.
75 See, Lin, (n 16) 1464-1470.
76 The NDDC prepared the NDRDMP in 2004. The
implementation of the NDRDMP was designed for a
15year period. This is in three phases of 5years each –
first phase 2006-2010; second phase 2011-2015; and the
last phase 2016-2020. See, NDDC, Niger Delta Regional
Development Master Plan (2004) <https://
www.nddc.gov. ng/downloads/3/eBooks>.
77 ibid 38-39.
78 Interview with Community stakeholder 4, Community
Member, Bayelsa State (Bayelsa State, 01 February 2015).
79 Informal institutions are norms, mores, customs and
traditions prevalent in a society. See, Enabulele (n 24)
132-135; Oliver E Williamson, ‘The New Institutional
Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead’ (2000) 38 (3)
Journal of Economic Literature 595, 596; Douglass North,
Understanding the Process of Economic Change
(Princeton University Press 2005) 50; and Valentin Seidler,
‘The Role of Informal Institutions in Building the
Institutional Framework of an African State: The Case
of the Kanuri in Nigeria’ (2011) <http://
homepage.univie.ac.at/valentin.seidler/wp-content/
uploads/2014/02/working-paper-2011_The-Role-of-
informal-instutions_Stanford.pdf>.
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value.80 A further consequence of the above, is the fact
that the members of the affected communities are
inadvertently provided with the opportunity to
withhold ownership of the implementation process
of the development initiative, as well as the outcome
of the latter. In any case, the development initiatives
often fail because of the lack of community
involvement /participation. This finding is consistent
with previous studies which argued that a lack of
community participation in design, handling and
implementation is responsible for the failure of most
strategies initiated in the NDR to alleviate the plight of
the people.81
4.2.5  Youth Restiveness
Another challenge is the problem of youth restiveness
in the NDR.82 For example, NDDC personnel 1 said
‘…of course the problem of youth restiveness in host
communities… They are actually limiting [us], because
sometimes when a contractor goes to site to do his job
they place so much demand on that contractor [to the
extent] that he is not able to meet up’.83 Similarly,
NDDC personnel 2 said that:
One of our major challenges is that of
youth restiveness which threatens
security in the region. We have also
become victims of this restiveness. Most
times when we take the projects to these
communities [in some instances] we
have been attacked. …we have been
beaten up, seriously manhandled in the
course of trying to give them the
projects.84
The above narratives suggest that the endemic nature
of youth restiveness in the NDR impedes the smooth
execution of projects, because they make overbearing
demands before projects can be executed in their locality.
It reveals a high level of insecurity in the NDR and
impacts on staff of NDDC whose task is to bring
needed developments to the region. The NDDC have
recognised this and have stated that youth restiveness
significantly contributes to the security challenges faced
in NDR.85 This perennial issue has created an
entitlement mentality amongst the youth, which further
aggravates the tumultuous situation in the NDR.
Indeed, such youth restiveness hampers the NDDC
from effectively delivering its mandate in the NDR.86
80 For the benefit of indigenous knowledge see, Emma
Crewe and Richard Axelby, Anthropology and
Development: Culture, Morality and Politics in a
Globalised World (Cambridge University Press 2013)
149; National Research Council, Responding to Oil Spills
in the US Arctic Marine Environment (National
Academies Press 2014); and Enabulele (n 24) 142-143.
81 Mboho and Inyang (n 69) 34; Oyewole M Bello and
Michael A Olukolajo, ‘Adequate Compensation as a Tool
for Conflict Resolution in Oil Polluted Wetlands of
Niger Delta Region of Nigeria’ (2016) 4(2)  Covenant
University Journal of Politics & International Affairs 34,
44; Kaniye SA Ebeku, ‘Critical Appraisal of  Nigeria’s
Niger Delta Development Commission Act 2000’ (2003)
International Energy Law and Taxation Review 203; and
Kaniye SA Ebeku, ‘Legal Aspects of Environmental
Issues and Equity Considerations in the Exploitation of
Oil in Nigeria’s Niger Delta’ (PhD thesis,  University of
Kent at Canterbury 2002) 444.
82 Lemmy Owugah, ‘Local Resistance and the State’ (Oil
Watch African General Assembly, Port Harcourt,
February 1999) citied in Ibaba S Ibaba, ‘Alienation and
Militancy in the Niger Delta: Hostage Taking and the
Dilemma of the Nigerian State’ (2009) 8(2) African Journal
on Conflict Resolution 11, 12-13.
83 Personal Interview (n 57).
84 Personal Interview (n 66).
85 NDDC (n 74) 16; Generally, on youth restiveness and
security challenges in the NDR, see, Augustine Ikelegbe,
‘The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta
Region of Nigeria’ (2005) 14(2) Nordic Journal of African
Studies 208; and Jeremiah O Arowosegbe, ‘Violence and
National Development in Nigeria: The Political Economy
of  Youth Restiveness in the Niger Delta’ (2009) 36(122)
Review of African Political Economy 575-594.
86 See, Samson I Omofonmwan and Lucky O Odia, ‘Oil
Exploitation and Conflict in the Niger-Delta Region of
Nigeria’ (2009) 26 (1) Journal of Human Ecology 25;
Human Rights Watch, ‘The Price of  Oil: Corporate
Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria’s
Oil Producing Communities’ (Human Rights Watch 1999)
3 <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/nigeria-
0199.pdf>; Enabulele (n 24) 220-221; and Joe Romm,
‘Dirty Money: Big Oil and Corporate Polluters Spent
Over $500 Million to Kill Climate Bill, Push Offshore
Drilling’ (2010) <https://archive.thinkprogress.org/dirty-
money-big-oil-and-corporate-polluters-spent -over-500-
million-to-kill-climate-bill-push-d7491209e04d/>.
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5
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
Our empirical findings suggest that the NDDC is
favourably biased towards the pursuit of infrastructural
and human capital development compared to
environmental protection. Not given due attention to
environmental protection generates negative
consequences. For example, the agitations in the NDR
have had a strong link with the region’s environmental
degradation. Our finding concerning NDDC’s greater
attention to its other responsibilities and less to
environmental protection corroborates prior studies.87
This raises the concern on whether NDDC cherry-picks
the responsibility it obliges itself to discharge. For
example, between July-September 2016, NDDC
executed 8,588 projects of which none related to
environmental protection/pollution.88 This gives the
impression that the NDDC’s mandate does not cover
environmental protection but only human and
infrastructural development. Our concern thus reflects
Bowman’s view that GCSs established in most
jurisdictions as responses to environmental pollution
have not actually involved recognition of harm to the
environment.89
Although the NDDC apparently compensate the NDR
by focusing on projects that will benefit  collectively
rather than financial compensation to individual
members of the communities, Adewale argued that
compensation could take the form of cash or in kind.90
GCSs in some instances are designed to recompense
victims financially,91 but a critical analysis of  the
functions of the NDDC shows that it is not designed
to pay financial compensation to victims. This evidence
is consistent with Farber’s argument that the best way
to utilise compensation funds is by tying them to
adaptation projects.92 The Nigerian government’s
approach is advantageous as the people collectively
benefit from the scheme. This is commendable being
consistent with the features of GCS such as the focus
to bringing relief to a large population93 and meeting
the needs of current and future environmental
degradation victims.94  However, studies have
evidenced defects in the ability of the NDDC as a GCS.95
Despite the important broad functions of the NDDC,
inadequate funding apparently accounts for one of the
key factors undermining its overall performance. Its
funds primarily come from contributory funding by
the government and oil companies. As the NDDC’s
contributory funding formula is statutorily enshrined,
it ensures the agency’s access to sustainable funding. Its
access to the contributory funds in reality is hampered
by the government’s failure to pay its counterpart
obligatory funding as the majority equity partner with
the oil companies. The government’s inadequate
funding of statutory agencies in Nigeria has been
symptomatic, and particularly acute in the oil industry’s
regulatory institutions responsible for administering
the command-and-control regulation.96 At a point, the
House of Representative Committee on the NDDC
had to appeal to the Federal Government to pay all
outstanding debts owed the NDDC.97 Despite the
poor funding compliance by the government, the
scheme is consistent with the funding arrangement of
GCSs, where the government is responsible on a welfare
basis98 but also levies companies responsible for the
pollution.99 Levying oil-companies as provided by the
87 Nliam (n 58) 250.
88 NDDC (n 74) 16.
89 Bowman (n 25) 12-13; and O’Hear (n 23) 163.
90 Ombolaji Adewale, ‘Oil Spill Compensation Claims in
Nigeria: Principles, Guidelines and Criteria’ [1989] Journal
of African Law 91, 103.
91 Farber (n 28) 1646.
92 ibid.
93 Hall (n 30) 141.
94 Lin (n 16) 1486 and Farber (n 28) 1635-1639.
95 Imobighe (n 53) 108 and Nliam (n 58) 250.
96 See, Enabulele (n 24) 221-3.
97 Chukwudi Akasike, ‘Pay Debts Owed NDDC, Reps
Committee Urges FG’ (December 17, 2017)  <https://
punch ng.com/pay-debts-owed-nddc-reps-committee-
urges-fg/>.
98 Hall (n 32) 114.
99 ibid and Farber (n 28) 1607.
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NDDC Act100 is a typical instance where the PPP101 is
reflected in Nigerian legal instruments. However
available records indicate that oil-related environmental
pollution remains unabated.102 Farber cautioned that
the existence of GCS should not be a basis to flout
pollution preventive measures.103
Our empirical analysis shows the NDDC’s
interventionist efficiency in bridging the infrastructural
gap in the NDR. This is commendable as it signals
government’s desire for restitution, implementation
of its duty of care and the promotion of social welfare
in the NDR, which are the ideals on which GCSs are
anchored.104 However, our findings contradict prior
studies that argue that the NDDC has not made any
significant progress in improving the living conditions
of  the Niger Delta people.105 NDDC’s performance
may be uncelebrated and dwarfed when compared with
the stream of revenues it has received since inception.
Given the evidence that the Commission has to make
do with its available resources following funding
shortfall from the government, it would appear that
the NDDC’s development of  the NDR depended
more on its administrative commitment and
effectiveness rather than on the quantity of funds at its
disposal.106
In addition to funding constraint, the NDDC is limited
by lack of  autonomy. Its lack of  autonomy is difficult
to address as it has a statutory basis. The NDDC Act
provides that the NDDC ‘…shall be subject to the
direction, control or supervision in the performance
of its functions under this Act by the President,
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Federal Republic of  Nigeria’.107 This provision is an
example of the militarised system of government
which Nigeria experienced before the inception of
democracy in 1999 (a year before the enactment of the
NDDC Act). The implication is that any project
embarked upon by the NDDC must be approved by
the president, regardless of its importance and/or
expediency.108 It has been highlighted that GCSs
formed part of  interventionist action plans of
government to provide collective protection and security
rooted in social welfare.109 Reflecting on the above, if
the intention of the draftsmen is to generously fast-
track the development of the NDR, does a
Commission with a governing board and operational
mandate need the consent of the president before it
can perform its functions? A statutory issue of this
manner can only be resolved through an amendment
of this provision of the NDDC Act to give the NDDC
full powers to execute projects independently. Hence,
the amendment of the NDDC Act is long overdue.
Legal instruments, whether national or international,
can only be useful to the extent they are designed to
reflect the substance of what they intended to address.
As the social, economic and environmental spaces in
100 NDDC Act, Sec 14 (2) (b).
101 See, de Sadeleer (n 34) 21-60; Khan (n 34) 638; Enabulele
(n 24) 63-77.
102 Enabulele (n 24) 2; See, Caroline Duffield, ‘Nigeria:
“World Oil Pollution Capital’ BBC News (15 June 2010)
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10313107>; Enabulele
and others (n 2) 56; ‘Initiative to Reduce Global Gas
Flaring’ (The World Bank, 22 September 2014) <http:/
/www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/09/22/
initiati ve-to-reduce-global-gas-flaring>; and US Energy
Information Administration, ‘Country Analysis Brief:
Nigeria’ (2016) <http://www.eia.gov/beta/
internat ional/analys is_includes/countr ies_long/
Nigeria/niger>.
103 Farber (n 28) 1646.
104 Floyd (n 10) 110-115.
105 Imobighe (n 53) 108.
106 Emeka Chianu, ‘NDDC – Another Shot at Infrastructural
Development of  Nigeria’s Oil Producing Areas’ [2001]
International Energy Law and Taxation Review 214.
107 NDDC Act, Sec 7 (3).
108 In a situation like this where the current the Nigerian
president, President Muhammadu Buhari is reported 
to have said he would not compensate those who voted 
5 per cent for him in the same way with those who 
voted 97 per cent for him in the 2015 general election. 
It is on record that a chunk of the NDR fall into the 
category of States that voted 5 per cent for the president, 
so it can be argued on the basis of this section that the 
president can deprive the Niger Delta people of 
development under the NDDC Act. See, Sunday Agbo, 
Phil Okose and Damian Duruiheoma ‘Buhari Election 
Promises to South East … 28 Months After’ Orient 
Daily (18 November 2017) <https://
or i en tda i l ynews .com/pol i t i c s/buhar i - e l ec t ion-
promises-south-east/>.
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109 Fagbohun (n 8) 204.
which all human and ecological interactions take place
are dynamic rather than static, a good legal system must
make allowance for resilience in accommodating the
needful changes premised on substantive reality.
6
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has argued that GCS is a potential tool for
the management of environmental degradation. It
identified that GCS were originally designed for victims
of crime110 and that it can be utilised to bring respite
to victims of environmental pollution. It established
that GCS is operational in Nigeria through the NDDC,
is used in tackling environmental degradation, as well
as to address the socio-economic discrepancies in the
NDR due to operations in the oil industry. Reflecting
on the extent of environmental degradation in the
NDR due to pollution emanating from the oil industry,
there is no doubt as to the significance and requirement
for policies and strategies to advance higher
environmental protection. Apart from the NDDC’s
operations tilting more towards human capital and
infrastructural development to the detriment of
environmental remediation, there are other challenges
bedevilling the Nigerian model of GCS. Therefore, the
potential effectiveness of the NDDC as a statutory body
to administer the GCS in Nigeria need to be examined,
as the aims of adequate provision of respite to victims
in the NDR, become of ever more increasing concern.
The implication of ineffective implementation of GCS
or any other strategy to mitigate the effects of activities
of the Nigerian oil industry is that achieving the United
Nations’ 2015 sustainable development goals111 may
remain elusive in the NDR.
110 ibid 218.
111 The principle of sustainable development is subsumed
in the United Nations time-bound strategies for
combating poverty, hunger, illiteracy, gender inequality,
disease and environmental degradation, what the
development now refers to as the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). UNDP, Energizing the
Millennium Development Goals: A Guide to Energy’s
role in Reducing Poverty (UNDP 2005) 1. Also, the UN
in 2015 sets out 17 Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs). See United Nations, ‘Sustainable Development
Goals’ <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs>.
For a discusses on sustainable development see, World
Commission on Environment and Development, Our
Common Future (Oxford University Press 1987) 27;
Stephen Tromans, ‘High Talk and Low Cunning: Putting
Environmental Principles into Legal Practice’ (1995)
Journal of Planning & Environment Law 779, 791-796;
Ifeanyichukwu A Aniyie and Osamuyimen Enabulele,
‘Overview of Energy Consumption and Sustainable
Development Relationship’ (2013) 14(1) University of
Benin Law Journal 112-115; Enabulele (n 24) 57-63; and
Michael Jacobs, ‘Sustainable Development as a
Contested Concept’ in Andrew Dobson (ed), Fairness
and Futurity, Essay on Environmental Sustainability
and Social Justice (Oxford University Press 1999) 31.
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